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The Constitution is worthy of high esteem, but we should also acknowledge its flaws. Whereas the former chapter concerns the fact that we aren't sufficiently on our guard about it, the latter concerns the fact that we don't sufficiently cherish what is good about it either. A certain difficulty chafes those who try to discuss it at all.
As George Carey has explained, 3 serious efforts to teach and understand what the Constitution meant to those who wrote and enacted it will inevitably seem partisan. In a sense they are. Those of us who speak of these things have different commitments than the proponents of a "living Constitution," which means a Constitution that means whatever they say it means. We are no more "neutral" than they are; we are only more objective. For a while people can be overawed by such incantations, but eventually they say, "I don't get it — it seems like smoke and mirrors.
It seems a terrible waste of time that so much of our teaching must be unteaching, that so much our effort must be expended just to prepare for Lesson One. All things considered, however, we do well to reach Lesson One — if we do reach it. Certainly the Federalists and Anti-Federalists reached no further.
- About this book.
- See a Problem?;
- A Preface to Morals by Walter Lippmann.
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
- Barchester Towers by Anthony Trollope?
- In The Dark;
- Building Facade Maintenance, Repair, and Inspection (ASTM Special Technical Publication, 1444);
Let us be humble and grateful. The final chapter, "The Illiberal, Liberal Religion," returns to the problem broached in this introduction, the relation between the City of Man and the City of God. Here especially I risk the charge that I've "left off philosophizing and gone to meddling. I don't dispute this claim; indeed I hold that proper toleration and respect for the dignity of conscience are duties of natural law. What I do challenge is a double distortion of history which is usually bundled up with the claim.
One side of this distortion concerns who discovered toleration; the other concerns what toleration really is. The idea that this virtue was discovered in modern times is an outstanding example of what happens when celebrities start believing their own press releases in this case, celebrities in the history of ideas.
I have little doubt that this preface has already provoked certain objections. Allow me to anticipate two.
Preface: The Disappearance of Moral Knowledge | Dallas Willard
One is an objection to the book's focus on natural law; the other is to the way the book discusses it. Perhaps the most interesting reason for considering it untimely to discuss natural law goes back to a terse, fascinating, and widely misunderstood article written a half-century ago by the philosopher G. In brief, Anscombe argued that modern moral philosophers had backed themselves into a corner.
On the one hand, they thought of morality as law.
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Summary and Analysis of Preface
On the other hand, few of them believed in all the other things one must believe in order to speak of law coherently. Anscombe thought that such incoherencies were at the root of the various other difficulties that plagued the theories then current, such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. It was as though people were trying to theorize about sums without believing in addition, or about ribs without believing in bones. What she proposed to these skeptics was not that they abandon moral philosophy, but that they carry on the enterprise in a different way. Henceforth they would admit that they had no business talking about morality as law; instead they would content themselves with describing the psychology of the moral virtues.
They would allow themselves to say "This is what it means to have honesty" or "This is the sort of person we admire as being courageous," but they would not indulge in the conceits that "Be honest" and "Be courageous" are moral laws. This suggestion prompted a great revival of philosophical reflection about virtue.
I am all for thinking about virtue. But there are several difficulties with the philosophical agenda "all virtue, all the time. She didn't oppose talking about moral law; she believed in it herself, and for her this was perfectly reasonable, because she believed in all the presuppositions of law, such as the lawgiver. Her suggestion to stop talking about moral law was only for those who didn't. Second, there are two different ways for a thinker who believes in law without a lawgiver to escape incoherency. Anscombe mentions one: Abandon belief in the law. But as her own case shows, there is another: Believe in the lawgiver.
In fact, the natural law tradition is not the only thing enjoying a renaissance.
- Singer Preface About Ethics.
- Henry E. Allison?
- Preface : Morality and PowerOn Ethics, Economics and Public Policy.
Since Anscombe's time, so is theism. To be sure, a certain kind of atheism is still the unofficially established religion of the opinion-forming strata of our society — the courts, the universities, the news media, the great advertising agencies, the whole pandering sector of the economy. The kind of atheism that these boosters favor is practical atheism. They don't really care whether people believe in a God; what disturbs them is belief in a God the existence of whom makes a difference to anything else. Theoretical atheism, by contrast, ran out of ideas quite a while ago.
Notwithstanding certain recent highly promoted pop culture books peddling atheism of the crudest and most ill-considered sort, 7 all of the new and interesting arguments are being made by theists 8 — and the sort of God whose existence they defend makes a difference to everything there is. Third, talking about law and talking about virtues aren't mutually exclusive. Every complete theory of moral law requires a theory of virtue. In fact, I suspect that every complete theory of virtue requires a theory of moral law.
Even Aristotle, who is supposed to be the paradigm case of a moral philosopher who talked only about virtue and not about law, talked about law. He holds that the man of practical wisdom acts according to a rational principle; this principle functions as law. He holds that virtue lies in a mean, but that there is no mean of things like adultery; this implies that there are exceptionless precepts, which also function as law. He holds that besides the enactments of governments and the customs of peoples there is an unwritten norm to which governments and peoples defer; this norm too is a law.
Consciousness of law creeps in through the back door even when it is pushed out the front, and Aristotle wasn't even pushing. But another objection can be offered to this book. Granted that one must drag ethics into politics, granted that one must drag natural law into ethics, granted even that one must drag God into the discussion of natural law — still, why it is necessary to drag in theology concerning God?
Why not just nice, clean philosophy? In the most ancient meaning of the term, theology was a branch of philosophy, "first philosophy," systematic reasoning about God, the supreme cause and principle of all things.
And it is quite true that a certain thin sort of natural law theory can get by with first philosophy alone. Today, though, the term "theology" is used for systematic reasoning about revelation concerning God. Must the cat be allowed to drag that old thing through the door? Walter Lippmann was an influential journalist and political theorist of the twentieth century. A Preface to Morals, his most well-known and influential book, was first published in In A Preface to Morals, Lippmann argues that in modern society traditional religious faith has lost its power to function as a source of moral authority.
See a Problem?
He asserts that ancient religious doctrine is no longer relevant to the conditions of modern life: governments have become increasingly democratized, populations have moved from rural to urban environments, and tradition in general is not suited to the dictates of modernity. Further, the democratic policy of the separation of church and state has created an atmosphere of religious tolerance, which suggests that religious faith is a matter of preference. In addition, the development of scientific method has created an atmosphere of doubt as to the claims made by religious doctrine. Lippmann offers humanism as the philosophy best suited to replace the role of religion in modern life.
He notes that the teachers of humanism are the wise men or sages, such as Aristotle, Buddha, Confucius, Plato, Socrates, and Spinoza, and that it is up to the individual to determine the value of their wisdom. He goes on to observe that one of the primary functions of religion is to teach the value of asceticism, or voluntary self-denial, as essential to human happiness. Lippmann describes an attitude of "disinterestedness" as essential to the development of a humanistic morality.
Disinterestedness, for Lippmann, is an approach to reality that puts objective thought before personal desire. He claims that the role of the moralist in modern society is not, as in traditional religions, to chastise and punish but to teach others a humanistic morality that can fulfill the human needs traditionally filled by religion. Lippmann's central themes in A Preface to Morals concern religion, modern society, moral authority, and humanism.
Values matter at the coalface of economic and social life. Moreover, values emerge within particular, historically defined situations. They are not exogenous data for the purpose of idealized models of reality; they are reality.